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Question

What key principle classifies asymmetric algorithms by whether their one-way function has a trapdoor?

Answer

"Some asymmetric algorithms rely on one-way functions WITH trapdoor, others on one-way functions WITHOUT trapdoor."

RSA has a trapdoor (knowing p, q); DH, ElGamal and ECC do not

* With a trapdoor, a secret shortcut makes the inverse easy for its owner; without one, the inverse is hard for everyone. *

This fundamental distinction divides all public-key cryptography:

Type Trapdoor? Example Hard Problem
RSA Yes — knowing $p, q$ Encryption + Signatures e-th root mod N (factoring)
Diffie-Hellman No Key exchange only Discrete logarithm mod p
ElGamal No Encryption + Signatures Discrete logarithm mod p
ECC No Encryption + Signatures Discrete logarithm on curves

With trapdoor means: there exists a secret (the factorization $N = p \cdot q$) that makes the inverse computation easy. Without it, the inverse is infeasible.

Without trapdoor means: the inverse is hard for everyone — there is no shortcut. Security relies on the mathematical structure, not a secret shortcut.

Go deeper:

The idea of trapdoor function. A trapdoor function f with its trapdoor t can be generated by an algorithm Gen. f can be efficiently computed, i.e., in probabilistic polynomial time. However, the computation of the inverse of f is generally hard, unless the trapdoor t is given.[1]
The idea of trapdoor function. A trapdoor function f with its trapdoor t can be generated by an algorithm Gen. f can be efficiently computed, i.e., in probabilistic polynomial time. However, the computation of the inverse of f is generally hard, unless the trapdoor t is given.[1]
IkamusumeFan · CC BY-SA 4.0 · Wikimedia Commons
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Question

What mathematical problem does RSA's security rely on, and who invented it?

Answer

RSA was invented by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman in 1978. Its security relies on the difficulty of factoring large numbers $N = p \cdot q$ and computing e-th roots mod N.

The RSA hard problem:

  • Forward: $c \equiv m^e \mod N$ — easy (square-and-multiply)
  • Inverse: $m \equiv \sqrt[e]{c} \mod N$ — hard without knowing $p$ and $q$

The factoring connection:

  • If you can factor $N = p \cdot q$ → you can compute $\varphi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$ → you can compute $d \equiv e^{-1} \mod \varphi(N)$ → you can decrypt
  • Factoring ⇒ e-th root (proven)
  • e-th root ⇒ factoring (believed but not proven)
  • There might be a way to compute e-th roots without factoring — but nobody has found one

Current recommendations (BSI 2023): RSA modulus $N$ must be at least 3000 bits (practically 3072 bits). Primes $p, q$ are each ~1536 bits (~462 decimal digits), making $N$ about $10^{1000}$.

Go deeper:

Adi Shamir, co-inventor of RSA (the others are Ron Rivest and Leonard Adleman)
Adi Shamir, co-inventor of RSA (the others are Ron Rivest and Leonard Adleman)
Ira Abramov from Even Yehuda, Israel · CC BY-SA 2.0 · Wikimedia Commons
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