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Question

What are the 8 attacks in the classic cryptographic communication model?

Answer

There are 8 fundamental attacks: eavesdropping, modifying, inserting, replaying, deleting messages, plus denying sending, denying receiving, and masquerading as someone else.

The 8 attacks and who mounts them

* The classic Alice / Eve / Bob model: 5 channel attacks, 2 repudiation attacks, 1 identity attack. *

The attacks target a channel between sender Alice (A) and receiver Bob (B), with attacker Eve (E):

# Attack Target
1 Eavesdropping (Abhören) Confidentiality
2 Modifying (Verändern) Data integrity
3 Inserting (Einfügen) Data authenticity
4 Replaying (Wiedereinspielen) Freshness
5 Deleting (Löschen/Unterdrücken) Availability
6 Non-repudiation of origin (Abstreiten Senden) Accountability of sender
7 Non-repudiation of receipt (Abstreiten Empfang) Accountability of receiver
8 Masquerade (Vortäuschen Identität) User authenticity

Tip: Group them as: 5 channel attacks (1-5), 2 repudiation attacks (6-7), 1 identity attack (8).

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The onion model of defense in depth
The onion model of defense in depth
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Question

Which security requirements map to which attacks in the classic crypto model?

Answer

Three security requirements — confidentiality, data integrity/authenticity, and user authenticity — each protect against specific subsets of the 8 attacks.

Security requirements mapped to the attacks each defends

* Each requirement defends a specific subset of the 8 attacks. *

Security Requirement Protects Against
Confidentiality Eavesdropping
Data Integrity & Authenticity Modifying, Inserting, Replaying, Deleting, Non-repudiation of origin, Non-repudiation of receipt
User Authenticity Masquerade

Notice that data integrity/authenticity covers the largest group (6 attacks). This is why MAC and digital signatures are so central to cryptographic protocols — they handle most of the threat landscape.

What about availability? It's deliberately absent from this model. The classic crypto model scopes the goals cryptography can enforce on a message — confidentiality, integrity/authenticity, and user authenticity. Availability (keeping a service reachable, surviving a DoS) is a systems/network property that crypto can't deliver: encrypting or signing a message does nothing to stop it being dropped or a server being flooded. It's part of the broader CIA triad, but it sits outside the cryptographic requirements.

Go deeper:

The onion model of defense in depth
The onion model of defense in depth
Own work · CC BY-SA 3.0 · Wikimedia Commons
or press any other key